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In an effort to evaluate socio-political instability, we studied the relationship between dynamic order,
socio-political upheavals and sustainability in nation states. Estimating the degree of dynamic order
inherent in the socio-political regime of various countries throughout the world involved applying Fisher
information theory to data from the Political Instability Task Force database. Fisher information is a key
method in information theory and affords the ability to characterize the structure and dynamics of
complex systems. The results of this work demonstrate that nation states bifurcate into two distinct
regimes, which exhibit a negative correlation between dynamic order, as determined by Fisher
information, and the prevalence of upheavals. Countries in the High Incidence of Upheavals regime with
low dynamic order (i.e., low Fisher information) experienced sixteen times more upheavals than the
countries in the Low Incidence of Upheavals regime with high dynamic order (i.e. high Fisher
information). Most importantly, our analysis demonstrates that newly industrializing countries suffer
from the most instability, which is manifested in low dynamic order thereby resulting in a high number
of upheavals. These results suggest that developing countries endure a period of socio-political
instability on their path to the developed world.
Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
The awareness of the strong links between socio-political and
ecological systems has increased over time (Lubchenco, 1998).
Environmental degradation is often a key contributor to sociopolitical instability, and democracy-building is not likely in the
face of poor stewardship of the environment (Lubchenco, 1998).
Further, understanding long-term trends in socio-political development can help in catalyzing a transition to sustainability (Kates
and Parris, 2003).
Countries with sustainable economies will exhibit less instability over time than countries with unsustainable economies
(Goodland, 1995). This is likely so, because countries that are
quickly using their own resources will need to ‘‘capture’’ more
resources from other countries. If an unsustainable economy
cannot secure additional resources via the market, that country
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may resort to securing additional resources via force. This presents
a problem from the environmental perspective, because good
governance and socio-political stability are precursors to environmental protection and sustainability (Rees, 2006). These are
unlikely in the presence of upheavals that result in human deaths
and suffering, destroy infrastructure, and divert attention and
resources away from environmental stewardship and sustainability (Kates and Parris, 2003). Since socio-political and ecological
systems are linked (Kates et al., 2001), a global transition to
sustainability is dependent upon maintaining socio-political order
in the face of change (Kates and Parris, 2003). Lubchenco (1998)
speculated that the future trajectory of earth would likely be
characterized by rapid change, and greater uncertainty about the
dynamics of ecological, as well as social and political systems.
In this study, we explored the relationship between dynamic
order, socio-political upheavals and sustainability in nation states.
We applied Fisher information (FI) theory to data from the Political
Instability Task Force (PITF) database (http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/pitfdata.htm) to estimate the degree of dynamic order
inherent in the socio-political regime of various countries
throughout the world. We also explored the relationship between
dynamic order and sustainability by analyzing data from the
Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI).

A.T. Karunanithi et al. / Global Environmental Change 21 (2011) 77–84

78

2. Methods
2.1. Fisher information
FI was developed by the statistician Fisher (1922) as a measure
of the amount of information in data. It is a key method in
Information Theory and provides a means of monitoring system
variables in order to assess the dynamic order of a system (Cabezas
et al., 2003). The form of FI used in this work was derived by Fath et
al. (2003) and Mayer et al. (2007) as:
I¼


2
1 d pðsÞ
ds
pðsÞ ds

Z

(1)

where, p(s) is the likelihood of observing a particular state (s) of the
system.
While Eq. (1) may be evaluated analytically or numerically
(Mayer et al., 2007; Karunanithi et al., 2008), the numerical
approach affords the ability to assess both real and model systems
and is derived as follows. Picking up from Eq. (1), we minimize
calculation errors that may result from very small p(s) by replacing
the probability density with its amplitude, i.e. q2(s) B p(s). Next, dp/
ds is solved as a function of q, such that:
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 2
dp
dq
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Eq. (2a) is substituted into Eq. (1):
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For use with discrete data, the integral is approximated by a
summation and simpliﬁed resulting in:
I¼4

n
X
½qi  qiþ1 2

(3)

i¼1

Further details of the analytical and numerical derivation of Fisher
information can be found in Mayer et al. (2007) and Karunanithi et
al. (2008), respectively.
The basis of computing FI is evaluating the state (i.e. condition)
of the system. As such, we use n measurable variables (xi) to
characterize a system over time resulting in a trajectory in a phase
space of n dimensions and time (Mayer et al., 2007). Each point pti
in this trajectory is deﬁned by speciﬁc values for each variable, i.e.
pti: [(x1(ti), x2(ti), x3(ti), . . ., xn(ti)] at a speciﬁc time. Given that there
is uncertainty in any measured value, each state s of the system is a
region bounded by a level of uncertainty (Dxi), such that if
|xi(ti)  xi(tj)|  Dxi is true for all variables, then the two points are
indistinguishable and noted as being in the same state of the
system (i.e. binned together). Accordingly, the probability p(s) of a
system being in a particular state (s) can be estimated by counting
the number of points deﬁned inside a particular state. This
approach affords the ability to designate all possible states of the
system over time.
One of the key elements of this approach is handling the
uncertainty inherent in real data. Since the measurement
uncertainty is typically unknown, two mechanisms have been
devised to manage it: setting a size of the states and using
tightening levels when computing FI. The size of states (i.e. Dxi)
may be estimated by computing the standard deviation for each
variable within a stable (minimal variation) time period in the
system trajectory (Karunanithi et al., 2008), and then applying
Chebyshev’s theorem which indicates that independent of the type
or form of the probability density function, the likelihood of
observations falling within k standard deviations of the mean is at
least 1  1/k2 (Lapin, 1975). Another approach is to locate a

surrogate system characterized by the same variables that exhibits
stability and assume that the variation within this system is an
estimated measure of uncertainty for the system under study.
Tightening levels are implemented to loosen the size of states
criteria such that a point can be declared within a particular state
of the system if some percentage of the variables ﬁts within the
boundary of uncertainty (Dxi). For example, a particular system
may be characterized by 100 variables, and if 95 of the variables
indicate that a point ﬁts within the boundary of uncertainty (i.e.
satisfy the size of states criteria), then the point would be binned in
that state at the 95% tightening level.
Since FI is based on the probability of observing different states
of the system over time, the variable time series are processed in
moving time windows. Then PDFs are generated and FI is
computed for each time window. The general methodology
employed to compute FI is as follows: (1) establish the size of
the time windows (hwin), (2) determine the time increment the
window will move forward (winspace) to create overlapping
windows, (3) set a tightening level, (4) bin all of the points into
states within each time window, (5) compute the probability
density for each state in each time window, (6) calculate FI from
the PDF in each time window, (7) set a new tightening level, (8)
repeat Steps 4 through 7 until all the required tightening levels
have been used and (9) compute mean FI over time. Further details
of the methodology are provided in Karunanithi et al. (2008).
According to Eq. (1), FI is proportional to the change in
probability over the change in state (i.e. dp/ds). Since information
may only be obtained when patterns are observable in the data
(i.e., completely random data has no pattern and zero Fisher
information), it is clear that the very presence of patterns implies
the existence of order. In this context, systems exist between two
idealized extremes, perfect disorder and perfect order. The perfect
disorder case occurs when a system is unbiased toward any
particular state. Accordingly, the system lacks order and has an
equal probability of being in any state of the system resulting in a
uniform PDF and FI approaching zero (Fath et al., 2003). Perfect
order occurs when repeated measurements of the system result in
the same state over time. This more structured system has high
order and is biased toward a particular state or states. Accordingly,
the PDF has a steep slope and FI approaches inﬁnity (Fig. 1).
However, real systems typically exist between these two extremes
(Fig.
1).
[()TD$FIG]

Fig. 1. Fisher information is proportional to the likelihood of observing the system
in a particular state (Pawlowski and Cabezas, 2008). (a) A system that has an equal
probability of being in any state is chaotic and disordered; accordingly, I ! 0. (b)
However, when a system is biased toward a state (or ﬁnite number of states), it is
more orderly and I ! 1. (c) Most systems exist between these two extremes.

[()TD$FIG]
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2.2. Approach

3. Results
Fig. 2 demonstrates a bimodal and strong negative correlation
between FI and the average number of upheavals for a large cross-
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Fig. 3. Mean number of upheavals vs. mean FI.

Table 1
Mean FI and upheavals (by development).
Development

Mean
FI

Upheavals

Newly industrialized countries
Other developing countries
Least developed countries
Developed countries

1.90
3.04
3.63
4.70

10.28
5.24
5.82
1.20

section of countries. This relationship converges asymptotically to
zero at higher FI values. As noted in the ﬁgure, at FI 3.7, there is a
transition in behaviour. The countries bifurcate into two distinct
regimes, a High Incidence of Upheavals (HIU) regime and a Low
Incidence of Upheavals (LIU) regime. The mean FI is 2.56 and 5.08
for countries in the HIU regime and the LIU regime, respectively.
The HIU regime has on average 7.35 upheavals, while the LIU
regime has only 0.46. When we aggregated the mean FI and the
mean number of upheavals (see Fig. 3), we observed a strong
negative correlation (r = 0.93). Moreover, we studied these
parameters as a function of development (Table 1 and Fig. 4) and
note that they have a strong negative correlation (r = 0.96).
Further, we ﬁnd that while developed countries (e.g. Sweden,
Norway, etc.) have the least upheavals and highest FI, the converse
is true of newly industrialized countries (e.g. China, Philippines,
etc.). Finally, as shown in Table 2, we grouped the data by type of
government and assessed the relationship between mean FI,
upheavals and the ESI. When aggregated in this way, both the
number of upheavals and ESI are strongly correlated with FI, with
correlation coefﬁcients of r = 0.67 (Fig. 5a) and r = 0.70,
respectively. Further, as shown in Fig. 5b, ESI and mean upheavals
are negatively correlated (r = 0.48). The communist form of
government (e.g. China) has the lowest FI and most of the
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Fig. 2. Mean FI vs. mean upheavals (by country).
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To quantify FI for various countries, we selected key state
variables from the Phase 3 data compiled by the Political Instability
Task Force (PITF) (Goldstone et al., 2000) which assesses political
instability and state failure. For this study, we used data from 1960
to 1997 for the countries in which there were complete time series
characterizing the demographic, social, political, leadership,
economic and environmental aspects of each country (see Table
A.1). As such, the data set includes 67 countries each characterized
by 21 variables over 37 years. The upheaval data was not used for
calculating the values of FI, but was used for the FI analysis. The
size of the state (i.e. level of uncertainty) for the study was
calculated using Sweden (i.e. a surrogate system) as it had not
suffered from any major socio-political upheavals during the study
period. Accordingly, we assumed that any variation in the time
series data was natural, random variation, and computed the
standard deviation (s) of the Sweden data for each of the 21
variables. This was used to set the level of uncertainty (Dxi) for the
study to 2s of the Sweden data. FI was computed for each time
window and is reported as a mean FI for each country.
Once the mean FI was computed, we compared it to the mean
number of upheavals by country and then aggregated the results
by level of development and type of government. We also explored
sustainability using the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI)
and compared it with FI. The ESI characterizes the environmental
stewardship of a nation and is represented by a score from 0 (most
unsustainable) to 100 (most sustainable). This composite metric,
based on a weighted average of 21 indicators, covers 5 pertinent
components of environmental sustainability to include environmental systems, reducing environmental stresses, reducing human
vulnerability to environmental stresses, societal and institutional
capacity to respond to environmental challenges and global
stewardship. In conjunction with the Environmental Performance
Measurement Project, the 2005 report contains ESI data for 146
nations (Esty et al., 2005).
The upheaval data was also gathered from the Phase 3 PITF
dataset. The PITF methodology for estimating upheavals assigns the
cumulative number of upheavals for the previous 15 years to a given
year. The time series data for the cumulative number of upheavals
over the previous 15 years from the PITF database was averaged over
the period of study to obtain ACNU15 values for the countries. Please
refer to Table A.2 for the list of countries, their mean FI, mean
upheavals, ESI, type of government and level of development.
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Table 2
Mean FI, upheavals and ESI (by type of government).

Key
Min

Government
Communist
Constitutional democratic republic
Constitutional monarchy
Constitutional monarchy and commonwealth realm
Constitutional republic
Democratic constitutional republic
Democratic republic
Federal parlimentary democracy and commonwealth realm
Federal republic
Military junta
Monarchy
Parlimentary democracy
Parlimentary democracy and commonwealth realm
Parlimentary democracy, federation and commonwealth realm
Parlimentary gov't w/ constitutional monarchy
Parlimentary monarchy
Parlimentary republic
Republic
Republic parlimentary democracy
parliamentary forms of government (e.g. New Zealand, Canada,
Japan, Spain, and Burkina Faso) have low number of upheavals. The
parliamentary democracy, federation and commonwealth realm
(e.g. Canada) has the highest ESI value. Moreover, while the
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0.00
4.05
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3.41
16.47
0.00
13.62
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.41
4.78
2.45

ESI
38.60
44.00
57.30
50.20
63.97
47.40
51.65
61.00
53.36
47.70
37.80
50.90
61.00
64.40
57.30
48.80
47.90
50.97
53.33

parliamentary democracy commonwealth (New Zealand) is
characterized by the highest FI, lowest upheavals and high ESI,
the communist government has the lowest FI, relatively high
upheavals and low ESI.
4. Discussion

70.00

70.00

FI
1.23
2.01
4.30
4.39
3.83
3.44
3.72
4.69
2.97
2.71
2.67
2.27
5.93
3.54
4.16
3.00
4.04
3.29
3.95

Max
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Mean Upheavals
Fig. 5. Mean FI, ESI, and upheavals by type of government. When aggregated by the
type of government, ESI (A) exhibits a strong positive correlation with FI and (B) is
negatively correlated with the number of upheavals.

Social organizations such as countries exist in a continuous
process of change punctuated by relatively stable regimes (Wiek et
al., 2006). The development trajectory of countries from least
developed to fully developed can be viewed as such a process.
Countries evolving from least developed to developed naturally
undergo profound changes that may include transformations in
their social structure, economies, and form of government. These
changes in organization can be manifested as changes in dynamic
order which can be quantiﬁed as changes in FI.
FI provides a method for assessing the socio-political dynamics
of nation-states, and allows for an assessment of the likelihood of a
particular nation to suffer from socio-political upheavals. This
method is a powerful tool for assessing the regime in which a
particular nation resides. Our results show that countries bifurcate
into two distinct regimes with, respectively, low FI and many
upheavals and high FI and few upheavals. There is a negative
relationship between FI and upheavals in the HIU regime which
converges into an asymptotic relationship tending to zero in the
LIU regime. The ability of FI to capture a robust, consistent and
strong relationship with upheavals in a highly complex nonphysical system is a signiﬁcant result. The results show that the
countries in the HIU regime are characterized by an average of 16
more upheavals and half the FI of the LIU regime denoting a
signiﬁcant change in the level of socio-political stability. The
results also demonstrate that newly industrializing countries
experienced the most socio-political upheavals, which is strongly
correlated with loss of dynamic order.
We also explored whether socio-political upheavals and FI are
related to the development level of the countries in the analysis
(Table 1 and Fig. 4). Countries in the dataset were classiﬁed as
developed and developing (CIA World Factbook, 2007) and where
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appropriate, the developing countries were further classiﬁed into
least developed (UN Conference on Trade and Development 2006)
and newly industrializing countries (Bożyk, 2006; Mankiw, 2007).
In this study newly industrializing countries are those which are
experiencing rapid growth outpacing their developing counterparts. Fig. 4 shows the average FI of the sixty-seven countries
grouped according to their development level. The transition from
least developed to newly industrialized country incurs a major
drop in FI (3.6–1.9) and a signiﬁcant increase in the average
number of upheavals (5.8–10.3). The least developed countries are
characterized by well established patterns with low variability
leading to high dynamic order (i.e., high FI). The pattern associated
with developing and newly industrializing countries are those of a
transition regime or a stage in development, characterized by
extremely high activity and a resultant low dynamic order (i.e. low
FI). The transition from newly industrializing country to a
developed country brings a major increase in FI (1.9–4.7) and a
signiﬁcant drop in the number of upheavals (10.3–1.2). This
suggests that nations that industrialize undergo a systemic
transition (characterized by disorder), and a reorganization, in
the process of becoming members of the developed world.
In addition, we assessed the relationship between FI, upheavals
and ESI by governmental type. An aggregation of the data at this
level underscores the correlation between environmental sustainability (i.e. ESI) and both dynamic order (i.e. FI; r = 0.70) and the
number of upheavals (r = 0.48) (Fig. 5A and B). Further, in Table
2, we are able to highlight the stability of the parliamentary forms
of government (e.g. New Zealand) which are typically characterized by relatively high FI and ESI, and low upheavals. The opposite
result is true for communist (e.g. China) and constitutional
democratic republic forms of government (e.g. Guatemala).
Armed conﬂict has direct, negative impacts on the environment
(for an extensive treatment see Conca and Wallace, 2009). In
particular, social upheaval has: (1) direct effects on ecological
systems (i.e., resource depletion, poor environmental management); (2) indirect effects via disruption of critical institutions and
infrastructure; and (3) indirect effects caused by refugees making
unsustainable choices due to starvation, need for shelter, etc.
(Conca and Wallace, 2009). Demographic change can also have a
negative impact on the sustainability of a resource base, which in
turn can disrupt socio-political stability (Adger et al., 2002). Adger
et al. (2002) document that demographic change in Vietnam
brought about the loss of forest cover, intensiﬁcation of agriculture
and depletion of renewable resources, via migration that resulted
in changes in consumption and production patterns. Thus,
demographic change indicates social upheaval (e.g., conﬂict,
economic change) that can have a negative effect on the resilience
of social-ecological systems (Adger et al., 2002). Further, as socialecological resilience erodes, the sustainability of a system declines
(i.e., environmental degradation) (Adger et al., 2002).
Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) found that corruption reduces
the effectiveness of environmental regulations, but the impact of
corruption lessens as political instability increases. On its face, it
would appear that high corruption and political instability would
have a compounding negative effect on environmental regulations,
but, at least in this study, this is not the case (Fredriksson and
Svensson, 2003). This result highlights that the connections
between socio-political instability, development and sustainability
are not ‘‘cut and dried’’; much more research is warranted in this
area. Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006) contend that it is less likely that
environmental quality can be improved in developing countries
(i.e., increasing economic growth) with dysfunctional institutions,
but they argue that by improving institutions and reducing
corruption, developing countries can induce higher economic
growth rates and better environmental policies (Pellegrini and
Gerlagh, 2006).
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Socio-political instability and institutional failure has been
shown to result in insecure property rights, which in turn resulted
in unsustainable rates of deforestation in many countries (Deacon,
1994; see also Bhattarai and Hammig, 2001). In a recent study of
Latin American countries, Culas (2007) found that by improving
institutions countries could reduce their rates of deforestation
while also enjoying economic growth. Improved institutions
allowed for this shift via enhanced property rights and better
environmental policies (Culas, 2007). Didia (1997) found a
negative correlation between the level of democracy (i.e., country
becomes more ‘‘democratic’’) and the rate of deforestation in a
study of developing nations. In particular, environmental groups,
market mechanisms, free elections and a free press are highlighted
as aspects of democracies that make them more stable, with better
institutions, and a greater capacity for good environmental
stewardship (Didia, 1997).
Conca and Wallace (2009), citing a signiﬁcant body of literature,
build a case indicating that poor environmental stewardship
precludes socio-political stability. They contend that poor environmental stewardship will result in increased vulnerability to
natural disasters, as well as a strong negative impact on the
institutions necessary for socio-political stability (Conca and
Wallace, 2009). In particular, they argue that the quality of
environmental stewardship is at the threshold of whether a
developing country travels down a peaceful or violent path. These
examples make clear that exploring the interaction between
environment, development and socio-political instability is
important on a global scale.
With respect to the observed systemic transition from the
developing to the developed regime, the implication is that service
economies create less pollution than countries with large
industrial bases (Jahn, 1998). Thus, the degree of modernization
and economic wealth is associated with countries that have made
the shift to the developed world (Jahn, 1998). As economies
develop, they should be expected to pass through stages of
development, where certain aspects of environmental quality (e.g.,
air quality) initially deteriorate and then improve with time
(Selden and Song, 1994; Grossman and Krueger, 1995). Environmental issues have a substantial effect upon economic transitions
(Chimeli, 2003). Studying transition economies in the former
Soviet bloc, Chimeli (2003) found that environmental quality was
effected by the existence of and strength of relevant institutions.
Creating and/or strengthening these institutions is very difﬁcult
when the country of interest suffers from a weak economy
(Chimeli, 2003). One recent study found that environmental
quality is better when there is more political competition coupled
with a high number of environmental groups; in short, environmental quality is dominated by socio-political factors (Grafton and
Knowles, 2004). Further, the likelihood of having sufﬁcient
environmental quality depends on the stage of economic
development (Xepapadeas and Amri, 1998). As economies grow
in developing countries, pollutants decline at a faster rate than in
low-income countries (Xepapadeas and Amri, 1998). The degree of
democracy has also been shown to have a positive effect on
environmental quality (Bernauer and Koubi, 2005).
Barrett and Graddy (2000), in a study analyzing numerous
pollution variables, found that environmental quality improves with
advances in civil and political freedoms. Congleton (1992) found that
the political regime is an inﬂuential factor in determining the
environmental policy of a country. In particular, the recent increase
in democratic regimes implies that there will be greater support for
global environmental agreements in the future (Congleton, 1992).
Along this line, Jahn (1998) found that institutional factors are
important for a shift to sustainability, however, the degree of
mobilization of environmental entities is the primary driver in such
a shift. Richer countries typically have stricter environmental
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standards and enforcement than middle-income and poorer
countries, which indicates that environmental quality is linked to
socio-political development (Grossman and Krueger, 1995). Thus, a
transition to sustainability requires economic (Arrow et al., 1995)
and political reforms (Barrett and Graddy, 2000), which are most
likely to occur in stable nation-states.

sound institutions and the rule of law will result in a process where
there will be less pressure on natural resources, which is critical to
a transition to sustainability. Our results suggest that FI is a useful
tool for understanding these dynamic interactions between sociopolitical and environmental systems.

5. Conclusions

Appendix A

So does socio-political stability precede good environmental
stewardship or vice versa? It is a difﬁcult question due to the multicausal interactions between instability and sustainability in
complex systems. What we do know is that monitoring, which
is critical to sound environmental management, is unlikely or
severely reduced in periods of social upheaval (Conca and Wallace,
2009). There are a number of examples that illuminate the
dynamic interactions between environment, development and
socio-political instability, and other factors. For instance, in Liberia,
social upheaval disrupted the rearing of cattle, which led to the
illegal harvest and trade of wildlife for local consumption and
export (Conca and Wallace, 2009). Liberia faced many challenges to
good environmental stewardship (e.g., ineffective institutions, lack
of funds), which were either created by or inﬂamed by social
upheaval (Conca and Wallace, 2009). As Conca and Wallace (2009)
contend, the Liberian example makes clear that there are spillover
effects in nations undergoing systemic transitions.
How do we reconcile the interaction between socio-political
instability, development and sustainability? Fraser et al. (2003)
offer the Rwandan genocide as an example of the difﬁculty
associated with determining the cause of social and environmental
instability. They cite multiple authors, some of whom focused
upon the social and political development of Rwanda as the root
cause of the turmoil, while other commentators asserted that the
genocide was driven by environmental degradation (Fraser et al.,
2003). It is most likely that in these complex systems, there is no
single ‘‘cause’’ of instability or an unsustainable state. Rather, the
interaction between social and environmental factors creates the
requisite conditions that result in system instability, a condition
Fraser et al. (2003) characterize as a reﬂexive relationship between
human society and the environment. Culas (2007) argues that

See Tables A.1 and A.2.
Table A.1
Variable list and description.

DESCRIPTION

Problem Country Indicator
Population Density (Ppl/Sq.Km)
Total Population
Trade(% GDP)
Population- Largest Ethnic Group
Population- Largest Religious Group
Real GDP Per Capita (chain index)
Infant Mortality Rate
Democracy Index
Autocracy Index
Discrimination Score
Years Leader Was In Office
Cropland Area
Forest/Woodland Area
% Population In Urban Areas
No. Of Border States States With Civil/Ethnic Conflict
No. Of Border States With Any Type Of Major Conflict
Memeberships In Regionally Defined Organizations
Maximum Yearly Magnitude Score
Religion Homogenity Index
Ethnic Homogenity Index
Category
Policital and Leadership
Demographic and Social
Economic and Environmental

ABBREVIATION
SFTPCONS
WDIPOPD
WDIPOPT
WDIOPEN
CULETHP1
CULRELP1
PWTRGDPC
UND26Y
POLDEMOC
POLAUTOC
DISPOTA2
BNNYROFF
FAOLAREA
FAOWOODS
UNUURBPC
MACNCIV
MACNAC
CIOD
SFTPMMAX
CULHREL
CULHETH

#
7
10
4

Table A.2
Data aggregation.
Country

Continent

Government

Development

Mean FI

Mean Upheavals

ESI

China
Guatemala
Morocco
Ghana
Malaysia
Thailand
Denmark

Asia
Latin America
Africa
Africa
Asia
Asia
Europe

Newly Industrialized
Developing
Developing
Developing
Newly Industrialized
Newly Industrialized
Developed

1.23
2.01
1.61
3.13
2.89
1.46
6.34

22.57
31.86
9.62
2.84
12.46
3.59
0.00

38.60
44.00
44.80
52.80
54.00
49.80
58.20

Norway
Sweden
Netherlands
United Kingdom

Europe
Europe
Europe
Europe

Developed
Developed
Developed
Developed

6.04
6.97
5.99
4.39

0.00
0.00
0.00
8.43

73.40
71.70
53.70
50.20

Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Honduras
Dominican Rep.
Costa Rica
Australia

Latin America
Latin America
Latin America
Latin America
Latin America
Latin America
Oceania

Communist
Constitutional democratic republic
Constitutional monarchy
Constitutional monarchy
Constitutional monarchy
Constitutional monarchy
Constitutional
monarchy
Constitutional monarchy
Constitutional monarchy
Constitutional monarchy
Constitutional monarchy and
commonwealth realm
Constitutional republic
Constitutional republic
Constitutional republic
Democratic constitutional republic
Democratic republic
Democratic republic
Federal parliamentary democracy

Developing
Developing
Developing
Developing
Developing
Developing
Developed

3.87
1.54
6.09
3.44
3.16
4.29
4.69

0.00
8.65
1.62
0.00
8.11
0.00
0.00

59.70
60.40
71.80
47.40
43.70
59.60
61.00

Nigeria
India
Austria

Africa
Asia
Europe

and commonwealth realm
Federal republic
Federal republic
Federal republic

Developing
Newly Industrialized
Developed

1.87
1.54
5.67

7.95
15.03
0.00

45.40
45.20
62.70
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Table A.2 (Continued )
Country

Continent

Government

Development

Mean FI

Mean Upheavals

ESI

Switzerland
Mexico
Brazil
Venezuela
Mauritania
Myanmar/Burma
Saudi Arabia
Israel
New Zealand
Canada
Japan
Spain
Burkina Faso
Greece
Madagascar
Cameroon
Central Afr. Rep.
Chad
Congo
Gabon
Egypt
Tunisia
South Africa
Benin
Côte d’Ivoire
Niger
Senegal
Togo
South Korea
Sri Lanka
Indonesia
Philippines
Finland
Italy
France
Haiti
El Salvador
Nicaragua
Argentina
Bolivia
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Turkey
Ireland
Portugal

Europe
Latin America
Latin America
Latin America
Africa
Asia
Asia
Asia
Oceania
Northern America
Asia
Europe
Africa
Europe
Africa
Africa
Africa
Africa
Africa
Africa
Africa
Africa
Africa
Africa
Africa
Africa
Africa
Africa
Asia
Asia
Asia
Asia
Europe
Europe
Europe
Latin America
Latin America
Latin America
Latin America
Latin America
Latin America
Latin America
Latin America
Asia
Europe
Europe

Federal republic
Federal republic
Federal republic
Federal republic
Military junta
Military junta
Monarchy
Parliamentary democracy
Parliamentary democracy and commonwealth realm
Parliamentary democracy, federation and commonwealth realm
Parliamentary gov’t w/ constitutional monarchy
Parliamentary monarchy
Parliamentary republic
Parliamentary republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic
Republic parliamentary democracy
Republic parliamentary democracy
Republic; parliamentary democracy

Developed
Newly Industrialized
Newly Industrialized
Developing
Least Developed
Least Developed
Developing
Developed
Developed
Developed
Developed
Developed
Least Developed
Developed
Least Developed
Developing
Least Developed
Least Developed
Developing
Developing
Developing
Developing
Newly Industrialized
Least Developed
Developing
Least Developed
Least Developed
Least Developed
Developed
Developing
Developing
Newly Industrialized
Developed
Developed
Developed
Least Developed
Developing
Developing
Newly Industrialized
Developing
Developing
Developing
Developing
Newly Industrialized
Developed
Developed

5.63
1.84
1.69
2.54
3.90
1.51
2.67
2.27
5.93
3.54
4.16
3.00
4.07
4.00
3.59
3.51
5.10
3.70
3.60
5.19
2.37
3.57
2.41
2.94
3.53
2.76
2.67
5.06
3.49
3.16
1.63
1.57
5.83
4.04
2.13
4.64
2.77
2.59
2.49
3.23
2.94
1.93
2.87
1.87
5.61
4.37

0.00
0.08
0.81
0.00
0.00
32.95
0.00
13.62
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.41
0.41
1.62
0.00
0.00
24.27
0.41
0.00
3.62
1.95
7.76
2.84
0.00
0.03
1.78
0.00
1.62
6.30
21.96
23.55
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.16
13.38
9.22
9.59
0.00
3.24
4.24
1.22
7.35
0.00
0.00

63.70
46.20
62.20
48.10
42.60
52.80
37.80
50.90
61.00
64.40
57.30
48.80
45.70
50.10
50.20
52.50
58.70
45.00
53.80
61.70
44.00
51.80
46.20
47.50
47.30
45.00
51.10
44.50
43.00
48.50
48.80
42.30
75.10
50.10
55.20
34.80
43.80
50.20
62.70
59.50
53.60
58.90
52.40
46.60
59.20
54.20
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